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Miller: Justice Sandra Day O'Connor

JUSTICE
SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR:
TOKEN OR TRIUMPH FROM
A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE
I.

INTRODUCTION

When Justice Sandra Day O'Connor was sworn in as the
102nd Justice of the United States Supreme Court,t she made
history. O'Connor was the first woman to attain a seat on the
Court in its 199 years of existence. 2 She represented a symbolic
reward for nearly 200 years of struggle by women for political
and social recognition in America. Feminists 3 applauded not
only her symbolic achievement' but also the potential substantive effect she could have on women's ongoing legal battles.
O'Connor gained entry into the most powerful and prominent
judicial entity in the nation and would have a tremendous op1. N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1981, at 8, col. 1. Shortly after Justice Potter Stewart offered his resignation from the Supreme Court in May, 1981, President Ronald Reagan
announced his selection of Judge Sandra O'Connor of Arizona as Stewart's replacement
in July. She was approved 99-0 in the Senate and took her seat on the Supreme Court in
October, 1981. For reaction to her nomination, see A Woman for the Court, NEWSWEEK,
July 20, 1981, at 16; The Brethren's First Sister, TIME, July 20, 1981, at 8.
2. The only other time a woman was considered for a position on the Supreme
Court was during the New Deal-World War II era of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman.
See Cook, Women as Supreme Court Candidates, 65 JUDICATURE 314 (1981-82) for a
comparison of Judge O'Connor to Judge Florence Allen, the sole female candidate during
that time.
3. "Feminists," for the purposes of this paper, refers to those who support, or appear to support, the doctrine or theory of "feminism." The definition of "feminism" will
be understood as "the theory of the political, economic, and social equality of the sexes."
WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 837 (4th ed.
1976).
4. See, e.g., The nomination of Judge Sandra Day O'Connor of Arizona to serve as
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings before the
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 278, 395 (Sept.
9-11, 1981) (statements of Kathy Wilson, National Women's Political Caucus, and Eleanor Smeal, President, NOW) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]. See also Schafran,
Sandra O'Connor and the Supremes, MS, Oct., 1981, at 71. "[W]e may ... take great
pleasure in this historic and long overdue appointment." [d. at 71-72 (Lynn Hecht Schafran was a New York City attorney and national director of the Federation of Women
Lawyers' judicial screening panel at the time MS printed her article).
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portunity for a positive, far-reaching impact on women's legal
rights. Effective use of that opportunity could outweigh her importance as a symbol of the rightful role of women as equal participants in society.~ Feminists anticipated that O'Connor's experiences as a woman would serve as an assurance of sympathy
in her legal decision-making on issues that affect women. 6
This Comment will examine the feminist perception of Sandra Day O'Connor's record on the Supreme Court on issues affecting women. 7 It will analyze how her decisions have fulfilled
and how they have disappointed feminist expectations. In view
of her performance on the Court, can Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor be, considered a "token" or a "triumph" for feminists?
II. ANAL YSIS
A.

A Conservative Judge

Between the time Ronald Reagan announced Judge
O'Connor of Arizona as his appointee, and the time Justice
O'Connor took her seat on the Court,8 there was a great deal of
speculation about her past record, her politics, her judicial philosophy and how these would influence her decisions on the
Court.9
5. See, e.g., Schafran, supra note 4, at 82. "I do suggest that she will bring to the
Court's deliberations on [women's) issues the touchstone of reality that has been so glaringly absent." [d. See also Kerr, The Woman Whose Word is Law, MS, Dec. 1982, at 52.
Kerr discusses O'Connor's philosophy and the extent to which it may be reconciled with
feminist theories to achieve a substantive gain for women. [d. (Virginia Kerr is a former
Supreme Court clerk and was an assistant professor at the University of Pennsylvania
Law School at the time MS printed her article).
6. See Kerr, supra note 5, at 84. "One hopes ... that she does not demonstrate
that class and race, more so than gender, determine perspective." [d.
7. This Comment will consider only briefly matters which may be of significance to
a broader constituency. See infra notes 50, 71-73 and accompanying text.
8. See supra note 1.
9. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, supra note I, at 16; TIME, supra note I, at 8. These articles
discuss O'Connor's background and philosophy, including somewhat simplistic predictions about her future performance. For more in-depth analyses, see Schenker, "Reading" Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, 31 CATH. U.L. REV. 487 (1982). This article profiles
Judge O'Connor's decisions on the Arizona State Court of Appeals and discusses how
they may be read as predictions of her Supreme Court performance. See also Riggs,
Justice O'Connor: A First Term Appraisal, 1983 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1. Riggs analyzes
O'Connor's background, political and judicial philosophies, and follows with a careful
examination of how these were revealed in her first term decisions.
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O'Connor had been a state assistant attorney general,IO a
state senator,! 1 a trial judge,!2 and an intermediate appellate
court judge. IS She was generally conservative on most issues. 1•
She was "tough" on crime, and was oriented toward favoring society's needs over the rights of the criminal. II! In her six years on
the state bench,18 she acquired a reputation as a fine legal technician and an excellent jurist. 17 She did not get a chance to hear
many federal issues or to decide matters of constitutional significance. 18 It was difficult to predict what her attitude would be on
the Supreme Court.
Since she had had extensive experience in the state system,
in the executive, legislative and judicial branches,!9 Justice
O'Connor was expected to approach issues before the Court
from the "state" point of view. 20 She had advocated deference to
state court decisions under federal court review. 21 This illus10. O'Connor served as assistant attorney general for Arizona from 1965 to 1969.
11. In 1969, O'Connor was appointed to the state senate by the Maricopa County
Board of Supervisors. She ran successfully for the seat in 1970 and 1972. In 1972 she was
elected senate majority leader.
12. In 1974 she was elected to the Maricopa County Superior Court.
13. O'Connor accepted appointment by Arizona Governor Babbit to the Arizona
Court of Appeals in 1979. She served on that bench for just over a year and a half before
she was appointed to the United States Supreme Court.
14. See, e.g., Riggs, supra note 9, at 3-12; Schenker, supra note 9, at 492-503. These
articles review O'Connor's state court record to reveal a conservative pattern in her reasoning on most issues, composed of meticulous fact analyses and strict statutory interpretation. O'Connor's conservative political and judicial background was a pivotal consideration for her appointment. See NEWSWEEK, supra note 1, at 16-17; TIME, supra note
1, at 11, briefly touching on President Reagan's selection requirements and how close
O'Connor came to fulfilling them.
15. See Riggs, supra note 9, at 19-26, reviewing O'Connor's decisions generally
favoring society's needs in the criminal context, and Kelso, infra note 40, at 270-71, arguing O'Connor's potential threat to the exclusionary rule.
16. See supra notes 12 & 13.
17. Wren, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor: Reflections of a Fellow Jurist, 1981 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 647; Matheson, Justice Sandra D. O'Connor, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 649. Both of
these articles are fairly sentimental profiles of O'Connor's tenure on the state court of
appeals. They describe her as an exceptional judge and a fine legal technician who displayed ability, clarity, and excellence on the bench.
18. See, e.g., Schenker, supra note 9, at 492-503. See chart illustrating O'Connor's
docket on the state bench. [d. at 492. See also Riggs, supra note 9, at 5-10. These two
articles describe the cases O'Connor dealt with on the state court, most of which did not
touch on federal questions.
19. See supra notes 10-13.
20. See Schenker, supra note 9, at 487-89; Riggs, supra note 9, at 11-12.
21. O'Connor, Trends in the Relationship Between the Federal and State Courts
from the Perspective of a State Court Judge, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 801 (1981). In this
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trated her belief in federalism as a doctrine of independent state
sovereignty and limited federal interference. 22 This concept of
the friction between state autonomy and federal intervention is
what shaped O'Connor's "state" orientation 23 in her approach to
issues before the Court. In addition, her judicial philosophy reflected deference to the legislature. 2 ' She had strongly argued
that the role of the Court is to interpret and apply the law without looking beyond the statutory language and history.21i She believed that courts should not engage in the creative decisionmaking characteristic of judge-made law which considers social
and cultural influences. 28 A judge, according to O'Connor, should
decide issues narrowly, through a carefully constructed rationale,
structured to avoid broad alterations in the law or sharp departures from precedent. 27 In short, O'Connor preferred to temper
her decisions through the conservative doctrine of judicial
restraint. 28
Despite her reputation as a judicial conservative, the conarticle, published shortly before her appointment to the Supreme Court, Judge O'Connor
discussed the need for federal courts to defer more to state court findings in order to
preserve "strong, independent and viable" judicial systems. [d. at 814.
22. Today's notion of "dual federalism" views federal and state governments as having their own separate spheres into which the other cannot intrude except in a cooperative effort for the common good. See Comment, Recent Tenth Amendment Decisions-Judicial Retreat From a Metaphysical Universe and a Return of Federalism
Analysis to the Congressional Forum, 1983 UTAH L. REV. 359, 360 n.10. See also infra
note 50, for an opinion in which O'Connor most clearly stated her federalism views.
23. See supra notes 20-22.
24. Schenker, supra note 9, at 489. See text and accompanying statistics demonstrating O'Connor's deferential attitude. [d.
25. See Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 57, 67 & 83. O'Connor discussed several
conservative judicial themes. In particular, she stated that judges should not reflect social changes in their decisions, rather the role of the judiciary is to interpret and apply,
not "create," the law. [d. See also Riggs, supra note 9, at 4-7. O'Connor believes the
judiciary should not be a law making body. Its decisions should be drawn as narrowly as
possible, and the rationale should stem directly from legislative history, intent and language. The role of judge does not include interpretations or reflections of changing social
or political values. [d. See also infra note 119 for definition of "interpretivism."
26. This judicial "activism" or "creativity" can be defined as "court-generated
change in public policy" that goes beyond interpretation and articulation of statutory
law. See Canon, Defining the Dimensions of Judicial Activism, 66 JUDICATURE 237, 239
(1982-83) (emphasis omitted).
27. See infra note 118 for definition of "judicial restraint." See also supra notes 25
& 26, discussing O'Connor's judicial philosophy.
28. See supra notes 26 & 27. O'Connor's limit on judicial creativity is restraint; she
keeps her decisions narrow and based on the "letter of the law." See Senate Hearings,
supra note 4, at 108.
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sensus was that O'Connor was neither doctrinaire nor particularly likely to "follow the leader."29 She approached problems on
a case by case basis and characterized each according to its own
facts. She was capable of manipulating her analysis of the facts
in order to make decisions unrestrained by ideology. Hence, although her philosophy appeared to coincide with that of the
Court's conservative bloc,30 Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist,31 she had demonstrated sufficient independence and
originality in the past32 to lead Court observers to predict she
would join the group of justices generally described as the
"swing votes."33 There were other chinks in O'Connor's conservative armor. For example, on the abortion issue,3. although
she expressed her personal beliefs,36 she refused to discuss what
her legal conclusion might be. 36 Members of the far right and
"pro-life" groups hotly contested her appointment because they
29. See generally Riggs, supra note 9. O'Connor's habit was to approach case analysis by careful examination and characterization of the facts and the law, and not to decide solely along ideological lines. Jd. at 43-46. See also Schenker, supra note 9, at 503.
Although O'Connor may have certain idealogical biases, she has the capacity to vote unexpectedly. Jd. at 490.
30. Schenker, supra note 9, at 489. "If the attitude reflected in Justice O'Connor
... carries over into her votes, the Burger-Rehnquist orientation may command the allegiance of a fourth Justice." Jd. See generally Riggs, supra note 9, at 10-46.
31. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist were both appointed by President
Nixon, in 1969 and 1974, respectively. They are generally accepted as the benchmark
conservatives on the Court. See Riggs, supra note 9, at 11 n.63, for President Nixon's
probable opinion of the present Supreme Court conservatives.
32. See supra note 29.
33. A "swing vote" is defined as either a moderate justice or one that "votes more
often with the majority result than with any other justice." Riggs, supra note 9, at 15
n.66. "Swing voter" may also be one who consistently votes unpredictably. Justices
Blackmun, Stevens, White and often Powell are regarded as "swing voters." Jd. Because
O'Connor relied so heavily on fact nuances, it was reasonable to assume she was capable
of joining this "swing" bloc. However, once on the Court, she joined the conservative
faction. See infra note 40.
34. The abortion issue, encompassing the validity of the Roe decision (discussed infra note 192 and accompanying text), the extent of the right to choose an abortion, and
the various moral, social and political implications involved, was a point of extensive
discussion following O'Connor's nomination, both in the press and in the Senate Hearings. See Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 60-63, 78-79, 98 & 125-27. See also TIME,
supra note 1, at 10-11 (see box); NEWSWEEK, supra note 1, at 16.
35. See Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 60-61. O'Connor admitted her personal
opposition to abortion. Jd. at 61.
36. Jd. at 60-61. Throughout the questioning before the Senate Committee,
O'Connor refused to discuss what her decision on any particular issue might be. She did
point out that personal views should not influence a decision, rather it should be determined by the facts and relevant law. [d. at 60.
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asserted that she was pro-abortion. 37 They argued that she supported abortion when she served in the Arizona State Senate although she explained her actions as turning on other matters.38
This kind of conjecture suggested a potential sympathy on a
critical issue. 39 Overall, however, Justice O'Connor did not appear to differ much from Justice Stewart, whom she replaced,
and her impact as far as the direction of the Court was not likely
to be significant.· o
B. Feminist Theory Reconciled

Feminists, however, wanted Sandra Day O'Connor to effect
a change in the present direction of the Court.41 They were concerned with what they saw as the erosion of women's rights
through some of the Court's recent decisions.· 2 With a newly
37. See, e.g., TIME, supra note 1, at 10; NEWSWEEK, supra note 1, at 16.
38. The allegations were based on O'Connor's voting record during her state senate
career on legislation dealing with abortion and birth control. See TIME, supra note 1, at
11 (box). See also Newsweek, supra note 1, at 16.
39. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 5, at 84. "[T]here is some reason to be optimistic
about the stand O'Connor will take [on the abortion issue]." Though she sees abortion as
"'morally repugnant,' [so] do many who defend Roe . ... " [d.
40. Kelso, Justice O'Connor Replaces Justice Stewart: What Effect on Constitutional Cases?, 13 PAC. L.J. 259, 270-71 (1982). Kelso compared the moderate Stewart to
the incoming O'Connor in an effort to predict what change, if any, she might have on the
direction of the Court. Due to the present composition of the Court and the fact that
Kelso thought Stewart and O'Connor had fairly comparable philosophies, he predicted
her vote would not be outcome determinative. [d. at 266-67, 270-71. It is apparent after
three years, however, that O'Connor is considerably more conservative than her predecessor Justice Stewart.
41. See, e.g., Schafran, supra note 4, at 82. See infra notes 46, 48 and accompanying
text.
42. See generally Denniston, What the All-Boys Bench Did Last Year, MS, Oct.
1981, at 74. This summary of decisions from the 1980-81 Supreme Court term illustrates
the Court's inability to assess women's rights without the limitations of cultural and
biological stereotypes. (See infra notes 51, 165, 185, 189 and accompanying text for discussion of such restrictions on women's equal participation in society). These cases included, for example, Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (women may be excluded
from draft registration without unconstitutionally discriminating on the basis of sex);
McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1980) (a spouse of a military serviceman could not
share in his pension upon divorce); Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981)
(males, but not females, may be held criminally liable for statutory rape without unconstitutionally discriminating on the basis of sex). These decisions, among others, were
strongly criticized by feminist authors as dangerously perpetuating restrictive sexual stereotypes. See generally Freedman, infra note 165, at 913; Williams, The Equality Crisis:
Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 175 (1982)
(comprehensive discussion on the status of women's rights as evaluated by the American
legal system, including the influences of biological and cultural expectations as they affect the sexes and legal rights).
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elected conservative president,,,a an aging Court,"" and the probable impending loss of two strong liberal Justices,U feminists
needed a sympathetic voice on the Court. They hoped that
O'Connor would alter the outcome of future decisions involving
the rights of women by arguing from the perspective of a woman
and by bringing some fresh perception of "real life" into a Court
that many felt had lost touch with the world outside."8
Although O'Connor espoused a conservative philosophy on
the bench,"7 feminists gleaned from that certain encouraging
signs. They argued that O'Connor's gender could be a source of
insight into women's issues."8 Feminists analogized O'Connor's
philosophy on federalism and the conflicts between state and
federal power to a corresponding recognition of the tension between individual rights and government intervention."e
O'Connor criticized overbearing federal interference with state
sovereignty.lio Similarly, women struggle against institutionalized
43. Ronald W. Reagan, a conservative Republican, was elected President of the
United States in November, 1980 and re-elected in November 1984. He will serve his
second four-year term through January, 1989.
44. Over half of the Justices on the present Supreme Court are over 75 years old:
Brennan, 79; Powell, 77; Burger, 77; Marshall, 77; Blackmun, 76. Justices Brennan and
Marshall, generally accepted as the Court liberals, and Justice Blackmun, who often
votes with them, reportedly are not in the best health. With President Reagan in office
through 1988, and the probability of vacancies on the Court, there is a distinct possibility that the Court could take on an even more conservative attitude. (The remaining
Justices: White, Stevens, Rehnquist and O'Connor, are 68, 65, 60, and 55, respectively.)
45. See supra note 44.
46. See, e.g., Schafran, supra note 4, at 84. Schafran discusses an ossified Court's
inability to understand reality: "Whatever her judicial philosophy, Sandra Day O'Connor
will bring to the Supreme Court a solidly grounded understanding of the real lives of
women in contemporary society." [d.
47. See generally supra notes 14, 15, 25, 40 and accompanying text. See also infra
notes 50, 118, 119, and accompanying text, explaining O'Connor's adherence to judicial
restraint and interpretivism.
48. See Kerr, supra note 5, at 84; Schafran, supra note 4, at 82. Generally these two
writers recognize the potential difference the gender of the new Justice may make both
in her decision-making and in her overall influence on the Court. Cf. Scales, Towards a
Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J. 375, 388 n.68 (1980-81). "[T]here is no guarantee
that female judges will have any particular sympathies by virtue of their gender." [d.
49. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 5, at 84. Kerr speculates that O'Connor's pro-state
position might be translated to a feminist theory of "exclusion from power," with the
related consideration of unwarranted intervention into the sphere of the less powerful by
the hand of the more powerful. This is analogous to government regulation of women's
reproductive decisions. [d.
50. See infra note 72. O'Connor disapproved the suppression of state autonomy
through the application of federal environmental regulations in Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 775 (1981) (O'Connor, J., concurring and
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interference with their individual autonomy, a symptom of their
political powerlessness and limited access to equal participation.
Biological and cultural stereotypes have been employed to justify the manipulation and regulation of women's reproductivity.lil This interference with individual autonomy, codified by
legislation li2 and judicial interpretation,1i3 entrenches archaic role
expectations which impair female equality. Men do not suffer
from this lack of control over their own reproductivity.Ii' This
denial of control to women forms a facet of gender discrimination which has been legitimated by stereotypic role expectations
and perpetuated by institutionalized blinders.11I1
Feminists emphasized the parallels between women's struggle for access to participation in society and a state's struggle to
be free from federal interference. 1i6 The essence of both is autonomy; the key to both is recognizing the oppression.
O'Connor recognized the conflict in the relationship between the federal and state systems.1i7 She should be able to correlate that struggle with the struggle for equality by women.1i8
Feminists argued that O'Connor, as a woman li9 and as a person
with fresh contact with the "real" world, entering a Court isolated by age and experience,6o potentially had the insight and
even the compatible philosophy61 to convey to the Justices that
dissenting).
51. See Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: A Critical Response to
Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 63 OR. L. REV. 265, 266 (1984). The goal of the battle
against sex discrimination has been equal access to participation in society. Women have
been barred from equal opportunities by regulation and restriction justified by cultural
stereotypes regarding a woman's "proper" role and by biological stereotypes regarding
her relative abilities and limitations. [d. at 266-69.
52. [d. at 301.
53. [d. See infra notes 141 & 142 for discussion of the Court's role in these matters.
54. Wildman, supra note 51, at 275.
55. [d. at 301.
56. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 5, at 82-84. Kerr, and feminists generally, tried to
reconcile O'Connor's conservatism with feminist goals in a way that wasn't "laughable."
[d. at 82.
57. See supra note 50 and infra note 72 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 56. The key to reconciling the theories of state sovereignty and
women's reproductive autonomy is the goal of freedom from outside interference.
59. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text indicating some feminists' hopes
that O'Connor's perceptions of women's issues would be affected at least as much by her
gender as by her conservative ideology. Kerr, supra note 5, at 84.
60. See supra note 46.
61. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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the essence of gender discrimination is exclusion from power.
The key to that exclusion is the denial of reproductive autonomy
to women because the ultimate effect of that denial is to limit
women's access to equal participation; they are disadvantaged
due to their gender, and men are not. 62
However, feminists had to be realistic. O'Connor had a conservative record63 and a conservative outlook. She was not a proponent of examining social influences while constructing her decisions. 64 As an "interpretivist,"66 she focused on the law itself
and not on the society which produced it. The impact of her
philosophy could as easily prove detrimental to women's rights.
Cultural and social changes affect the meaning of such concepts
as "sex discrimination."66 To give flesh to the meaning of sex
discrimination it is vital to examine the society that practices
it. 67 It is to this that O'Connor objects.68 Feminists hoped, at the
least, that O'Connor's experiences as a woman would help shape
her perception of issues and solutions affecting women's rights
and outweigh her tendency to decide cases narrowly without
considering the broader needs of women69 as a group. Armed
with the knowledge that Sandra Day O'Connor had a conservative yet pragmatic reputation and a somewhat favorable, though
sparse, record on women's issues,7o feminists awaited the results
of her performance on the Supreme Court.
C. Some Positive Signals
Initially, Justice O'Connor did not disappoint general expectations. As virtually all commentators anticipated, she voted
62. Wildman, supra note 51, at 266.
63. See supra note 14 and accompanying text for discussion of O'Connor's judicial
record.
64. See infra notes 118 & 119, defining relevant conservative judicial doctrines.
65. [d.

66. See infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text for expansion of the notion that
the cultural and biological stereotypes which ostensibly justify government restrictions
also seriously influence the Court's concept of what constitutes sex discrimination.
67. Wildman, supra note 51, at 305.
68. See supra note 25 and accompanying text for discussion of O'Connor's dislike of
"creative" decision-making.
69. See supra notes 48-49, 59 and accompanying text.
70. See Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 278, 395 (statements of Kathy Wilson,
National Women's Political Caucus, and Eleanor Smeal, President, NOW, discussing
O'Connor's achievements as a woman lawyer and as a supporter of women's groups).
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conservatively on criminal matters,71 federalism,72 and standing
and jurisdiction issues. 73 She was even more strongly conservative than was originally expected7 • and consistently yielded to
the decisions of state legislatures and courtS.711 She agreed with
her conservative colleagues Burger and Rehnquist on many issues 76 but demonstrated enough independence so as not to be
considered a shadow or a puppet to those two. 77 Feminists had
stoically expected O'Connor's conservatism. 78 However, some
early positive signals in her decisions on women's issues that
came before the Court'9 offered encouragement to feminists.
1.

Rights of Illegitimate Children

In Mills v. Hableutzel,80 O'Connor voted with a unanimous
Court to strike down a one year statute of limitations on the
filing of paternity suits by illegitimate children in anticipation of
a suit seeking child support. 81 The Court held, in an opinion
written by Justice Rehnquist, that the Texas statute violated
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment by imposing such a restriction on illegitimate children. Though both
71. Riggs, supra note 9, at 19-26. O'Connor's record on criminal justice reveals a
strong commitment to "law and order." [d. See, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501
(1984) (adopting the "inevitable discovery doctrine" as an exception to the exclusionary
rule).
72. Riggs, supra note 9, at 40-43. As expected, O'Connor showed deference to state
authority. [d. Her views on federalism were most clearly stated in her dissent from the
majority opinion in FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 755 (1981) (O'Connor, J. concurring and dissenting). "State legislative and administrative bodies are not field offices of
the national bureaucracy . . . . Instead, each state is sovereign within its own domain
. . . . The constitution contemplates ... a system in which both the state and national
governments retain a 'separate and independent existence.''' [d. at 777 (citations
omitted).
73. Riggs, supra note 9, at 26-32. O'Connor preferred judicial restraint; she found
copious reasons for not reaching the merits, particularly by insisting that standing had to
be eminently clear. She argued for exhaustion of all state remedies prior to a Supreme
Court hearing. [d. See, e.g., Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982).
74. See Riggs, supra note 9, at 19.
75. See supra note 72.
76. Riggs, supra note 9, at 12-19.
77. O'Connor did part company with her conservative colleagues on some issues. See
infra notes 163-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of her most dramatic departure from the conservative position.
78. See supra text and accompanying notes 63-65.
79. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 5, at 52, 80 (discussing cases analyzed infra notes 80,
100, 163 and accompanying text).
80. 456 U.S. 91 (1982).
81. [d. at 101.
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legitimate and illegitimate children had the right to seek child
support from their estranged fathers under Texas law,82 only illegitimate children had to first establish the threshold fact of
paternity. Hence, while Texas provided the opportunity to establish paternity through a court action, the one year statute of
limitations made that opportunity "so truncated that few could
utilize it effectively."83 The Court decided that the opportunity
must be long enough so that such children, or those suing in
their behalf, could bring the action despite the difficult personal,
financial and social constraints associated with bearing children
out of wedlock. 84 The state's argument that it was attempting to
prevent fraudulent or stale claims81i was insufficient to sustain
the legislation because Texas failed to prove that these problems
were particularly affected by the twelve month cut-off.86 Therefore, the requisite substantial relation between the legitimate
state interest of preventing fraudulent or stale litigation and the
one year statute of limitations was lacking. 87
Justice O'Connor concurred in a separate opinion,88 adding
that the holding of the Court did not prejudge the constitutionality of a longer statute of limitations. 89 She maintained that
while the state had a legitimate interest in preventing stale or
fraudulent claims, its competing interest of protecting genuine
claims undercut that justification. 90 This latter interest included
not only a legitimate desire to see that" 'justice is done,' "91 but
also a desire to prevent swelling of the welfare rolls.92 O'Connor
also pointed out that only paternity suits, actions "unique to il82. [d. at 92. The Court was referring to a prior case, Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535
(1973), in which it held that once a state affords legitimate children the right to receive
support from their fathers, it must afford the same right to illegitimate children.
83. Mills, 456 U.S. at 97.
84. [d.
85. [d. at 101. The state, in arguing that its interest lay in preventing stale or fraud-

ulent claims, asserted that the proof problems involved in establishing paternity lent
themselves to fraud or staleness. Blood tests, for example, do not prove paternity but
merely set up a probability which places the alleged father in the "pool" of prospective
fathers. [d. at 98 n.4 (explanation of relevance of blood test results).
86. [d. at 101.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

[d.

Mills, 456 U.S. at 102 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
[d. at 106.
[d. at 103.
[d.

[d.
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legitimate children,"93 were singled out for special treatment
even though there are countless proof problems in other kinds of
civil actions. 9• This coupled with the state's attempt to severely
limit any efforts to prove paternity cast doubt on the permissibility of the motivation behind the statute. 911 O'Connor reiterated, in closing, the kinds of social and financial obstacles that
prevent the filing of paternity suits during a child's early years
which include jeopardizing the relationship with the child's father.96 These problems, she argued, exist beyond the first twelve
months of a child's life and therefore could bar an even longer
statute of limitations on paternity suits. 97
O'Connor's analysis of the kinds of problems illegitimate
children and their mothers must face, and her articulation of
these concerns in a separate opinion, indicated to feminists that
she was particularly sensitive to those difficulties. 98 It was, they
hoped, a precursor to a deeper identification with the legal
struggles of women.
In a pair of decisions concerning the scope of Title IX of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,99 O'Connor continued to show limited
signs of sympathy with feminist concerns about equity in education and employment.
2.

Gender Based Discrimination in Education

O'Connor conspicuously joined the liberal bloc in North Haven Board of Education v. BelPoo to apply Title IX prohibitions
93. [d. at 104. See also id. at 104 n.3 explaining the general rule of tolling the statute of limitations when a minor has a cause of action.
94. Mills, 459 U.S. at 104.
95. [d. at 104-05.
9S. [d. at 105-0S. O'Connor reiterated the social and financial obstacles to such
suits, including jeopardizing the relationship with the father and other emotional strains.
[d. at 105 n.4.
97. [d. at 102, lOS.
98. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 5, at 52. Because the entire Court voted to strike
down the one year statute of limitations, O'Connor's vote should be little indication of
any particular concern on her part toward the claims of illegitimate children. But that
she went to the trouble to concur separately and to uncharacteristically broaden the
holding indicates strong feeling on the matter. Riggs, supra note 9, at 36.
99. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1978): "No person ... shall, on the basis of sex, ... be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... " [d.
100. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982) (two boards of education
challenged regulation promulgated under Title IX, arguing that they were not applicable
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against discrimination on the basis of sex to employees of educational institutions lOl as well as to students. The Court said that
the scope of the statute included employment practices l02 and
the words "no persons"103 in the statute included employees of
education institutions. lo• Conservatives Burger and Rehnquist
joined Powell in dissent,106 insisting that it "tortures the language"106 of Title IX to extend it to employment. l07 O'Connor's
departure from this narrow interpretation represented not only
a sign of her independence,108 but an indication of her receptiveness to expansion of statutory meaning in a gender discrimination context.
Unfortunately, O'Connor did not so broadly interpret Title
IX in a later case, Grove City College v. Bell. l09 The Court held
that Title IX is program-specific when applied; its prohibitions
only apply to those programs which receive federal funding llO
directly or indirectly.111 Grove City College accepted no direct
funds ll2 from the federal government, but some of its students
received federal grants without school participation. ll3 The
Court decided that this indirect aid to the college triggered Title
IX protection but that it was program-specific and therefore
only affected the financial aid program which disbursed the
funds.ll4 Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented
in part,116 maintaining that Title IX should be applied instituto employment practices at educational institutions).
101. Id. at 530.
102. Id. at 520.
103. Id. at 521-22.
104. Id. at 530.
105. North Haven, 456 U.S. at 540 (Powell, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 541.
107. Id. at 554-55.
108. See Kerr, supra note 5, at 52, 53.
109. 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984) (a private college challenged the application of Title IX
sanctions where the only federal funding it received was indirect).
110. Id. at 1222.
111. Id. at 1220. Title IX application is triggered where federal financial assistance
is granted directly to the school or granted to students for the purpose of attending
school, an indirect form of funding to the school. Id. at 1216.
112. Grove City College, 104 S. Ct. at 1214. The school accepted no funding from
the federal government directly, nor did it participate in assessing student need for the
purpose of direct federal grants. Id.
113. Id. at 1214-15. Basic Education Opportunity Grants (BEOG) are federal grants
awarded to students without assessment of need by the schools. See supra note 112.
114. Id. at 1222.
115. Id. at 1226 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
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tion-wide. Both the history of the statute and the purpose of the
funding pointed to this result.u6 O'Connor, however, was not
willing to expand on the scope of Title IX.1l7 She was willing
only to recognize its application in a situation of indirect federal
funding. Her policies of judicial restraint1l8 and interpretivism1l9
operated more strongly to define her decisions than any possible
sympathies for feminist goals.
3. Disparity in Employment Benefits

In Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris,t20 O'Connor
joined the portion of Marshall's majority opinion which held12l
that retirement plans which paid lower benefits to female employees violated Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights ACt. 122 The
lower payments to women were based on an impermissible sex
classification since sex was the sole component differentiating
longevity risk levels in particular age brackets.123 The Court interpreted Title VII as requiring that other pertinent variables be
taken into account so that risk allocation is based essentially on
the individual rather than the gender class of which the employee is a member.124
116. [d. at 1237.
117. Groue City College, 104 S. Ct. at 1223 (Powell, J., concurring) (Justice
O'Connor joined in Justice Powell's opinion).
118. Riggs, supra note 9, at 5. Riggs paraphrases Justice O'Connor's definition of
judicial restraint as deciding cases on "appropriately narrow grounds," on other than
constitutional grounds where possible. [d. (quoting Judge O'Connor from her confirmation hearings before the Senate).
119. Riggs, supra note 9, at 1. "Interpretivism" is a "concept of judicial review
which denies the legitimacy of giving content to constitutional rules by reference to naturallaw, contemporary social values, or any other source external to the Constitution." [d.
at 5 (footnote omitted).
120. 103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983) (a state employee challenged the validity of state deferred retirement compensation plans under Title VII which used sex-based mortality
tables for calculating payments, resulting in lower monthly payments for female
retirees).
121. [d. at 3499.
122. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2oooe-2(a) (1981): "It shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to discriminate against any individual with respect to ... terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of ... sex .... " [d.
123. Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3498. The plan required all employees to pay in the same
amount but women received lower payments. [d. at 3497.
124. [d. at 3498-99. The Court relied on its rationale in Los Angeles Dept. of Water
& Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1979), in which the Court held it impermissible
under Title VII to require female employees to make higher contributions into retirement plans in order to receive the same monthly payments as male employees. [d. at
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O'Connor emphasized in her concurrence l2G that the issue
the Court decided was whether solely sex-based actuary tables
used for calculating retirement payments fall within the scope of
the sex discrimination which Congress contemplated under Title
VII.126 The Court did not decide the broader issue of whether
sex is an appropriate consideration in insurance schemes available either to private individuals or to employees. 127 In addition,
O'Connor reiterated the importance of "language, structure, and
legislative history."126 Characteristically, she sought to limit the
decision to the facts presented in this case. She emphasized that
the discrimination occurred between employer and employee
when the former presented a choice of retirement payment
schemes which were all computed on sex-based tables.129 That
was not to say that the use of such tables themselves was a violation of Title VII if a female employee purchased whatever plan
she preferred on the open market where both sex-based and
non-sex-based plans were available. ISO Strict adherence to statutory construction and restraint from any expansion controlled
O'Connor's decision.
Although feminists agreed with O'Connor's vote in Norris,l3l they found her concurrence troubling. It was not clear
what she thought about sex-based tables as a whole. The feminist position would decisively label any payment plan based
solely on gender as discriminatory, regardless of the availability
of other non-sex-based plans. Sex alone is an unreasonable and
unfair basis for assessing longevity given all the other relevant
variables. 132 O'Connor's hedging on the issue was unfortunate
and discouraging to feminists.
711.

125. Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3510 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 3510-11.
127. Id. at 3511.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3511 (citing Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1979)).
131. See, e.g., Note, A Step Towards Insurance Equity: Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 251-64 (1984). Generally Norris is a step in the
right direction toward treating employees equally on an individual basis. See also Comment, Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris: Mandate of Manhart, 86 W. VA. L. REV. 437 (Winter 1983-84).
132. Variables other than sex include "smoking habits, alcohol consumption, weight,
medical history, or family history." Norris, 103 S. Ct. at 3495.
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The Court decided several other cases that dealt with equality of benefits flowing from employment. In Newport News
Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. EEOC,133 O'Connor voted with
the majority,134 which held that an employer violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA)131i of Title VII when it provided certain pregnancy-related medical benefits to female employees but not to their male counterparts. 130 The thrust of the
PDA, the Court found, was to overturn the Court's 1978 decision
in General Electric v. Gilbert,137 which had held that the denial
of pregnancy-related medical benefits to female employees did
not constitute sex discrimination. 130 Now the Court recognized
pregnancy-related classifications in employment situations as
impermissible sex discrimination.139 This finding in Newport
News, which O'Connor supported, was particularly significant
for feminists who had been extremely frustrated with the Gilbert case.
/'
Feminists had argued, in the wake of the Gilbert decision,
that the Court had failed to recognize that special or different
treatment of pregnancy or pregnancy benefits merely perpetuated gender discrimination; it represented government control of
a woman's reproductive choices which a man does not have to
endure. 14o When the Court legitimated this special treatment by
133. 103 S. Ct. 2624 (1983) (the EEOC challenged the validity of a medical benefit
plan which provided benefit& for pregnancy-related expenses for female employees but
provided less extensive pregnancy benefit& for female spouses of male employees).
134. O'Connor parted with fellow conservative Justice Rehnquist who wrote a vehement dissent. [d. at 2632.
135. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981): "The term[] 'because of sex' include[sl ... on the
basis of pregnancy. . . and women affected by pregnancy . . . shall be treated the same
for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefit& ... as persons not so
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work." [d.
136. 103 S. Ct. at 2627.
137. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
138. [d. at 145-46. See also Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 (1974) (pregnancy
discrimination was not a sex classification within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment).
139. See supra note 135.
140. Wildman, supra note 51, at 301. The Court seems to be confused about how to
deal with the biological differences between the sexes in the context of gender equality.
It seems unable to reconcile equal participation notions with the fact that the sexes are
fundamentally and unchangeably different. It has allowed the state to restrict women's
reproductive choices because women are different from men (and the male is generally
used as the standard from which "female" necessarily deviates). The Court has continued to uphold legislation based on biological stereotypes; it has been "side-tracked" by
the physical differences between the sexes. [d. 301-04.
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interpreting it as not discrimination on the basis of gender, it
participated in limiting women's access to equal participation.
The value of women in the economic sphere is affected by these
limitations, as is their status in the society generally.lU The
Court has unfortunately recognized and accepted a woman's biological reproductive abilities as a justification for special or different treatment, therefore it has allowed interference with a
woman's individual autonomy. A man suffers no such interference. This prerogative which the state claims over a woman's reproductivity but not a man's is a key component in the gender
discrimination scheme. As long as women are precluded from reproductive autonomy, they are effectively barred access to participation on an equal basis with their male counterparts. That
Sandra O'Connor seemed to agree with the Court's recognition
that disparate pregnancy benefits equal sex discrimination was a
very encouraging sign to feminists. It would, of course, be unwise
to make too much of O'Connor's vote in this matter; the decision
was statutorily mandated and did not expand on the equal protection meaning of sex discrimination. 142 Further, O'Connor was
not so moved as to write separately as she did in Mills.143
In a later case, Hishon v. King & Spalding,l44 also involving
the privileges and benefits of employment, but not related to
pregnancy, a unanimous Court held that Title VII prohibitions
against sex discrimination applied to the process of considering
141. See Scales, supra note 48, at 375-76. This article focuses on the issue of pregnancy because it illustrates the final battleground in the war for equal treatment of the
sexes; the condition of pregnancy, unique to women, has served, historically, as an excuse
to limit women's access to the public sphere and to equal participation in society. [d. See
also infra note 189.
142. This distinction is important because Geduldig v. Aiello, 412 U.S. 484 (1974), is
still good law, therefore the present equal protection meaning of sex discrimination does
not include in its classification on the basis of pregnancy. Sex discrimination under the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act does include pregnancy within its scope. What feminists
want the Court to understand is that sex discrimination within the meaning of the Constitution means limitation on access to equal participation. Restricting reproductive control, in the context of pregnancy, abortion, birth control, etc., eliminates equal access and
results, therefore, in discrimination on the basis of sex. Wildman, supra note 54, at 30102.
143. See supra note 88. Writing a separate opinion is evidence of strong feeling on
the issue, and is a good indication of the actual attitude of a Justice. Riggs, supra note 9,
at 36.
144. 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984) (a female lawyer alleged that the law firm for which she
worked as an associate for six years discriminated on the basis of sex when it did not ask
her to become a partner).
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associates for partnership in a law firm. The firm had argued
that Title VII requirements did not apply to it, rather Title VII
was intended to apply only to larger business organizations. 1411 In
addition, application of the statute would infringe on the first
amendment rights of the partnership.146 The Court disagreed. It
found that Title VII attaches once an employment contract relationship commences and it applies to the "terms, conditions or
privileges" of that employment. 147 The promise to consider associate lawyers for partnership is a privilege of employment in this
context and is therefore subject to Title VII requirements. 14s
The holding in Hishon extended the protections of Title VII
to the "boys club" realm of the law firm. This was a major step
forward for women in a profession which has been and virtually
remains predominantly male.149
In another case involving women gaining access to a "boys
club," the Court in Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,tIlO upheld the application of the Minnesota Human Rights Act m to compel the
Jaycees to accept women as regular members.11l2 The Court
found that the Jaycees' attempt to shield itself from sex discrimination prohibitions by claiming first amendment rights was inapposite. llls Although the first amendment protects intimate and
145. Id. at 2235 n.l0 and accompanying text.
146. Id. at 2235.
147. Id. at 2233-34.
148. Id.
149. See generally Winter, Survey: Women Lawyers Work Harder, Are Paid Less,
but They're Happy, 69 A.BA J. 1384 (Oct. 1983). Due to male domination in the legal
profession, female lawyers are implicitly forced to work harder and juggle more responsibilities. The article also discusses perceptions of female lawyers, how they deal with
parenting in conjunction with work, etc. See also Fossum, A Reflection of Portia, 69
A.BA J. 1389 (Oct 1983). Thirty-seven percent of all law students are women. Of 606,000
lawyers in the U.S., 94,000, or 14%, are women, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics. Id.
150. 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984) (the Jaycees sought to enjoin enforcement of the Human
Rights Act of Minnesota, passed pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited sex discrimination in public accommodations. The Act, if applicable, would strike
down the Jaycees' restrictive policy of admitting women only as "associate" members
and would compel the organization to admit women as "regular" members).
151. MINN. STAT. § 363.03(3) (1982) defines it as an "unfair discriminatory practice
[tJo deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public accommodation because of
... sex." Id.
152. Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. at 3255.
153. Id. at 3250-55.
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expressive associations,1114 the Court decided that neither characterization shielded the Jaycees in this context. 11111 The Jaycees organization was too large and unrestrictive in its membership to
constitute a personal or intimate association. It could not be described in terms of smallness, selectivity or seclusion to fall with
the former category of association under the first amendment. 1116
Although the Jaycees did have the "collective effort" selectivity
necessary to fall with the category of expressive advocacy, the
state's interest in eradicating gender discrimination outweighed
any concerns about infringing on first amendment rights. 1117
Justice O'Connor, although concurring in the result/ 1I8 differed on the proper first amendment analysis. She offered an alternate approach which distinguished between expressive and
commercial associations.lIIs The Jaycees, she asserted, were primarily involved in the latter and should receive lessened first
amendment protections. 160 O'Connor indicated that her analysis
would be a more effective protection of women's rights because
it would disallow the first amendment shield where the majority's rationale might sustain it. 161
4.

Affirmative Action in Nursing Education

Although her argument in Jaycees has been criticized,162
O'Connor manifested an awareness of the dangers of invidious
sex discrimination and the need for the proper judicial mecha154. [d. at 3250.
155. [d. at 3251.
156. [d. at 3250-51. Characteristics of "intimate associations" involve "personal affil-

iations" that are small and selective, such as marriage, childbirth, and cohabitation relationships. [d.
157. Jaycees, 103 S. Ct. at 3252-53. The collective efforts for the shared goal of promoting assimilation of young people into the business community would be unaffected
by allowing women as regular members in the organization, hence its expressive nature
was not sufficient to warrant first amendment protection. [d.
158. [d. at 3257. (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting).
159. [d. at 3258. O'Connor argued that the Jaycees involvement in providing goods
and services rendered it commercial speech which should receive less first amendment
protection. [d. at 3261.
160. [d. at 3261.
161. [d. at 3257. O'Connor's analysis would protect women who sought access to
organizations involved solely in commercial speech, whereas the majority might sustain
the first amendment protection in another context due to the expressive aspect of the
association. [d.
162. See Note, Leading Cases of the 1983 Term: Freedom of Association, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 87, 195 (1984).
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nism for eradicating it. This apparent understanding of women's
struggles was never more clear than in her analysis of Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan. ls3 She concluded in her
majority opinion that Mississippi University for Women School
of Nursing (MUW) could not lawfully deny a male admission to
the nursing program solely on the basis of his sex. lS4 O'Connor
utilized a value- or sex-neutral analysis on the sex discrimination claim. lslI This analysis involved a double hurdle test which
first seeks to determine the actual purpose of the state restriction or classification, and whether it is an important purpose.
Second, it asks whether the gender classification (the "means")
is substantially related to the state's important purpose or interest (the asserted "end").lss
MUW asserted that its purpose was to compensate women
for the effects of past discrimination through a form of educational affirmative action. ls7 Justice O'Connor, however, found
first that MUW had not provided any evidence to support the
assertion that women had suffered from discrimination in the
nursing profession in the past. lS8 She argued that even if such
evidence were provided, MUW was causing harm under the
guise of affirmative action. She pointed out that the school's sexbased admission policy tended to "perpetuate the stereotyped
view of nursing as an exclusively woman's job."ls9 By reserving
the program for women alone, MUW had created the "self-fulfil163. 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (a male nurse alleged that a state supported college of
nursing discriminated on the basis of sex within the meaning of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment when it denied him admission to the program because he was male).
164. ld. at 733.
165. See Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92
YALE L.J. 913 (1983). The value-neutral analysis asserts that any sex-based classification
must be carefully tailored to serve recognized and important state interests. The underlying biological differentiation between the sexes is inherently suspect as a justification
because of the dangers of creating or reinforcing gender stereotypes. Therefore, a test
which is virtually blind to gender and which examines strictly the means-ends relationship to the asserted state purpose is preferred.ld. at 949-60. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976). This case illustrates the middle tier of scrutiny now associated with sex discrimination cases. It is more rigorous than differential minimal scrutiny, but not as rigorous as the strict scrutiny utilized in race cases. ct. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (application of strict scrutiny in an equal protection sex discrimination case failed to get majority support).
166. Freedman, supra note 165, at 949-51.
167. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 727.
168. ld. at 728-29.
169. ld. at 729.
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ling prophecy"170 that nursing is, and will continue to be,
women's work. O'Connor warned that "[clare must be taken in
ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects
archaic and stereotypic notions."l7l She found that the purpose
of compensating women for past harms done was impermissible
here. The admission policy in itself was a reflection of the kind
of harm it purported to correct. It mirrored traditional, paternalistic notions about women, rather than rectifying any alleged
wrong. 172
O'Connor went on to say that even if the purpose were
valid, the admissions restriction did little to effect that purpose
since men were allowed to audit courses in the nursing program. 173 Since neither the actual purpose nor the tailoring of the
means to achieve certain goals could satisfy the test, O'Connor
found the sex-based classification unconstitutional under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.174
In separate dissenting opinions, Chief Justice Burger171i and
Justice Blackmun 178 each focused on their concern that the majority opinion threatened to render all single sex education institutions unconstitutional, even though O'Connor stressed that
the decision was limited to the facts of the case. 177 Although her
language was eloquent on the dangers and subtle effects of stereotype-based legislation, much of her decision was limited by the
unique nature of the nursing profession, which has long been
recognized as a sex-segregated profession. 178
170. [d. at 730.
171. [d. at 725 (emphasis added).
172. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 729-30.
173. [d. at 730-31. O'Connor was referring to the second part of the equal protection-sex discrimination analysis which requires the state's classification to be substantially related to its objective. [d.
174. [d. at 733.
175. [d. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
176. [d. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
177. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 723 n.7, limiting the scope of the decision to Mississippi
University for Women School of Nursing.
178. [d. at 729-30. The existing stereotype which labels nursing as women's work
made this intermediate level of arialysis easy to apply. The conflict between the state
purpose and the means used to achieve it is fairly clear. Such clarity is unique to this
case. There is no indication, however, that O'Connor will abandon this analysis when the
facts are not so suitable.
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Powell's dissent l79 discussed at length the need to preserve
choices for women, while O'Connor stressed the dangers of limiting choices for women through institutionalized sex-stereotyping. Feminists applauded this latter emphasis. 180 Classifications
which are ostensibly aimed at protecting or assisting women can,
in effect, create or perpetuate stereotypes that are harmful to
both sexes. The danger lies in codifying role expectations that
limit the opportunity for equal participation by both sexes in
society. Feminists support a level of scrutiny which delves into
the subtle effect of such legislation. 181 Such an analysis exposes
the stereotyped basis of the reasoning behind the legislation and
therefore reveals the harm of the classification. 182
O'Connor's adoption of this kind of value-neutral, heightened analysis was a welcome surprise to feminists. It ran counter
to the conservative reputation she had built for herself on other
issues. 18s She won extensive feminist praise in the wake of Hogan l8' because she so willingly attacked the legislative justification for the sex classification and so strongly supported the feminist position which rejects the biological and cultural strictures
limiting women's access to political and social participation. 1811 It
was encouraging for feminists to observe O'Connor's departure
from her previously-held interpretivistl86 stance to include in
her opinion a broader recognition of the subtle barriers to
179. ld. at 735, 737-38 (Powell, J., dissenting).
180. See, e.g., Note, Reinforcement of Middle Leuel Reuiew Regarding Gender Classifications: Mississippi Uniuersity for Women u. Hogan, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 421
(1984) (generally supporting the Hogan analysis). See also Note, Sex Discrimination in
Higher Education-The U.S. Supreme Court and a Bastion of Tradition: Mississippi
Uniuersity for Women u. Hogan, 1983 S. ILL. U.L.J. 71 (1983) (suggesting the potential
for expansion of the holding to all single-sex education institutions). But see Miller, The
Future of Priuate Women's Colleges, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 153 (1984) (arguing that the
ramifications of expanding Hogan would be injurious to sex equality). "As an alternative
institution designed to give power to a powerless class of people, the woman-centered
university should be allowed to experiment with new ideas and educational forms.
[TJhey must ... argue ... that voluntary separatism does not violate the fourteenth
amendment . . . . " ld. at 187.
181. See Freedman, supra note 165, at 968.
182. ld. at 952.
183. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 165, at 958-65.
185. ld. at 965-68. See Williams, supra note 42, at 175. These articles discuss the
difficulties of escaping the biological and cultural role expectations surrounding gender
when defining and redefining sex equality. See also Wildman, supra note 54, at 265-69.
186. See supra note 119 for definition of "interpretivism."

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol15/iss3/2

22

Miller: Justice Sandra Day O'Connor

1985]

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

515

women's progress in society. IS?
D.

The Abortion Issue

O'Connor's sensitivity to the disadvantages women suffer
from the oppression of stereotypic role expectations suggested
that she might be sensitive to the oppression of women in the
context of abortion restrictions. ISS O'Connor could correlate her
analysis regarding limitations on women's rights at MUW to the
realm of reproductive autonomy.IS9
As noted above, Justice O'Connor had expressed her personal opposition to abortion but had never had the opportunity
to rule on an abortion case. She had presented herself as an interpretivist and did not favor expanding broadly on the words of
the Constitution. Because the right to choose an abortion was
first recognized in Roe v. Wade l90 under the "concept of personal liberty"191 and the right to privacy within the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment, and not in the express language of the Constitution itself,192 there was a good possibility
187. See supra notes 42, 169-72 and accompanying text for discussion on the difficulties of overcoming cultural barriers to sex equality.
188. Wildman, supra note 51, at 301. O'Connor's understanding of the state's mishandling and misunderstanding of women's rights at Mississippi University for Women
might translate to recognition of a woman's right to be free from legislative meddling in
her individual sovereignty. Kerr, supra note 5, at 84.
189. See Wildman, supra note 51, at 301-04. Abortion, pregnancy, birth control and
other matters related to a woman's reproductivity all touch on the main issue of sex
discrimination since legislative efforts to control these matters result in limiting women's
access to full participation in society. All, then, are sex discrimination issues and all raise
similar equal protection questions. [d.
190. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
191. [d. at 153.
192. See id. at 152-53, for discussion of the origins of the right to privacy and the
kinds of rights it encompasses. Only those personal rights that can be called "fundamental" may be included in the right of personal privacy. [d. at 152. The Roe case established within the right to privacy a limited right for a woman to choose to terminate her
pregnancy. [d. at 153. This qualified right to choose an abortion cannot be infringed
upon by the state without a compelling interest. Although the Court recognized the state
had an interest both in the health of the mother and in the potentiality of human life,
the Court said these only reach a compelling level at certain stages during the pregnancy.
[d. at 155. This has been called the trimester framework which roughly describes the
time and extent to which a state may regulate a woman's right to choose an abortion.
The state's interest in the woman's health becomes compelling at approximately the beginning of the second trimester. At that time the state may regulate abortions, if the
regulations are necessarily related to the asserted interest. [d. at 164-65. The state may
proscribe abortions altogether when its interest in the potentiality of human life attaches
at approximately the beginning of the third trimester. [d. at 163-64. See also Griswold v.
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that O'Connor might not support either the right or the Roe decision. As a conservative and an advocate of judicial restraint,
she could be expected to be critical of this technique of "finding" rights without express Constitutional wording. 193 Previously, Justice O'Connor had not looked favorably upon this kind
of "judge-made" law. 194 Feminists were unable to predict to
their satisfaction O'Connor's reaction to the series of abortion
cases that came before the Court.
1.

Disappointment on a Critical Issue

In the lead case, City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,t96 the Court held, per Justice Powell, that a series of restrictions on abortions in an Akron ordinance l96 violated a woman's right to choose to have an abortion. 197 These
restrictions included the following requirements: a) that all second trimester abortions be performed in a hospital; b) that notice to and consent from the parents of an unmarried minor
under fifteen be obtained; c) that the attending physician make
certain specified statements to insure consent is "informed consent;" d) that the physician observe a twenty-four hour waiting
period after the patient signs the consent form; e) that the fetal
remains be disposed of in a "humane and sanitary" fashion. 198
The Court found that these requirements, without sufficient
justification, too heavily burdened the exercise of the right to
choose to have an abortion. 199 While the Court expressly reaffirmed Roe,20o it refined the trimester framework analysis enunciated in that case by incorporating into it recognition of the
medical advances made since the time of Roe. 201 These advances
make abortions performed during the early portion of the second trimester much safer than before. Therefore, although the
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), for the origins of the right to privacy.
193. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text for a discussion on O'Connor's
attitude toward "creative" or judge-made law.
194. [d.
195. 103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983).
196. AKRON. OH., CODIFIED ORDINANCES ch. 1870 (1978).
197. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
198. AKRON, OH., CODIFIED ORDINANCES §§ 1870.03, .05-.07, .16 (1978).
199. 103 S. Ct. at 2504.
200. [d. at 2487.
201. [d. at 2495-97.
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state's interest in maternal health still becomes compelling at
approximately the beginning of the second trimester, that interest must be protected by regulations that contemplate both relevant medical advances and the preservation of the discretion of
the attending physician in the relationship with his or her patient. 202 With this in mind, the requirement that all second trimester abortions be performed in a full service hospital infringes
on a woman's right to choose an abortion because it does not
take into account the safety with which early second trimester
abortions may be done in less expensive, out-patient facilities. 203
It is not reasonable to require hospitalization in those cases
where maternal health can be adequately protected at a clinic. 204
The Court next held that the parental consent requirement
did not provide alternate means for the minor to establish that
she is emotionally mature enough to make the abortion decision
herself. 2011 Without that alternate procedure, the parental consent restriction was essentially a veto power by a third party and
therefore unconstitutional. 206
The Court decided that the requirement that a physician
recite a prescribed litany in order to establish that the woman
seeking an abortion had given true "informed consent" usurped
the physician's professional judgment.207 Not only was the prescribed litany an "undesired and uncomfortable strait jacket"208
to the physician, but it also "is fair to say that much of the information required is designed not to inform the woman's consent but rather to persuade her to withhold it altogether."209
Among other things, the ordinance required that the doctor tell
the patient that the fetus is a human life from the moment of
conception,210 and that the doctor continue with a detailed
202. [d.
203. [d.
204. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2497.
205. [d. at 2498. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 651 (1979) (parental consent requirements were unconstitutional if they represent a "blanket" veto provision. But if a satisfactory procedure were
set up through which a minor may establish her maturity for the purposes of the abortion decision, such a requirement might stand).
206. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2498-99.
207. [d. at 2500.
208. [d. at 2499 (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 67 n.8).
209. [d. at 2500.
210. [d. The Court pointed out that such a requirement is inconsistent with Roe
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description of the development of the fetus-its ability to feel
pain, the psychological ramifications of the abortion 211 -all constituting a virtual "'parade of horribles.' "212 Although the
state's legitimate interest in the woman's health was furthered
through a general "informed consent" requirement,213 it did not
follow that the state may prescribe the contents of the informed
consent or purport to establish what constitutes informed consent. To the extent a state requires a doctor to recite a particular "list" of information, it has unreasonably prevented the physician from following his or her own judgment, upon which the
patient is relying. 214 A consent requirement which leaves room
for the physician's discretion and actually goes to informing the
patient of pertinent facts regarding her particular condition and
her choice of abortion is constitutionally permitted.2lI! However,
it was unreasonable to require the doctor personally to inform
the patient when that duty could easily be delegated to other
qualified personne1. 216
The Court disposed of the twenty-four hour waiting period
as impermissibly arbitrary; the state had failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that the requirement furthered the
alleged purpose of insuring full and informed consent.217 The
waiting period merely served to financially and emotionally burden women by forcing them to make at least two trips to obtain
an abortion. 218 It also limited the doctor's discretion regarding
the timing of the procedure, and increased the health risks
through unnecessary delay.219 Finally the Court held that the requirements with respect to the disposal of the remains of the
which held a state may not adopt a theory of when "life" begins to justify its regulation
of abortion. Id. (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 159-62).
211. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2500.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 2501. "[A) state may require that a physician make certain that his patient understands the physical and emotional implications of having an abortion ...
[through) general subject matter relevant to informed consent." Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 2501.
216. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2501-02. "[T)he critical factor is whether [the woman)
obtains the necessary information ... from a qualified person, not the identity of the
person from whom she obtains it." Id.
217. Id. at 2503.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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fetus were unconstitutionally vague. 220
In two companion cases, the Court dealt with similar restrictions with varying outcomes. In Planned Parenthood u.
Ashcroft,221 the Court held a series of abortion requirements
constitutional. 222 These included a requirement that a pathology
report follow every abortion, a parental consent requirement for
unmarried, minor women, and a requirement that a second physician be present during an abortion performed after "viability"
of the fetus. 223 Five members of the Court, however, could not
agree on the rationale. 224 A majority of the justices merely
agreed, for different reasons, that the state's reasons for establishing the requirements were sufficiently justified and that the
burdens on a woman's right to choose an abortion were not prohibitive. 2211 Justice Powell, writing for himself and Chief Justice
Burger,226 argued that the pathology report on the fetus furthered the state's compelling interest in discovering any abnormalities which could affect the woman's health. 227 The burden
on the exercise of the right to choose abortion was not significant, nor was the cost sufficiently affected to be prohibitive. 228
Similarly, the requirement that a second physician attend an
abortion performed after viability229 for the purpose of protecting the unborn child was a permissible exercise of the state's
power to protect the potentiality of human life. 230 Finally, the
parental consent requirement contained the requisite alternate
220. [d. at 2504.
221. 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983).
222. A hospital requirement, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.025 (Vernon 1983), similar to
that in Akron was held unconstitutional for the same reasons. [d. at 2520.
223. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 188.028, 188.030, 188.047 (Vernon 1983).
224. Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion, joined by
Chief Justice Burger. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. at 2518. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, dissented from all but the hospital finding. [d. at 2526.
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices White and Rehnquist, dissented from the hospital
finding and from Powell's reasoning, though she concurred in the balance of the findings.
[d. at 2532. See infra notes 239-64 and accompanying text where O'Connor's dissent is
discussed.
225. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. at 2526 (judgment of the Court).
226. [d. at 2518.
227. [d. at 2524-25.
228. [d. The Court viewed the pathology report as "a relatively insignificant" record
keeping burden. [d. at 2524-25.
229. "'Viability' is defined as 'that point at which the fetus ... [is) potentially able
to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid.''' City of Akron v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. at 2505 n.1 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 160).
230. [d. at 2522.
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means through which the minor could establish her maturity to
make the abortion decision. 231
The liberal bloc joined Justice Blackmun in dissenting232
from these findings. He argued that the requirements were improperly tailored to meet the asserted state interests and unconstitutionally infringed upon a woman's right to choose to have
an abortion. 233
In the final case, Simopoulos v. Virginia,234 the Court upheld a statute requiring that second trimester abortions be performed in a licensed hospital. 23& The Court carefully pointed out
that "hospital" in the statute did not mean solely full-service
hospitals but also included properly equipped outpatient clinics.
This broader definition distinguishes the Virginia statute from
those in Akron and Ashcroft. 236 The state legitimately furthered
its interest in protecting maternal health by insuring that the
facilities which provide abortions are safe and operating within
accepted medical standards. 237 In addition, the requirement that
second trimester abortions take place in a licensed clinic left the
method and timing of the abortion precisely where they belong-with the physician and the patient. 238
Justice O'Connor dissented strenuously in the Akron
case. 239 In her separate opinions in both Ashcroft 240 and Simo231. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. at 2526. See supra note 205 discussing parental consent
requirements generally.
232. [d. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Blackmun argued it was an extraordinary burden to require a pathology report for all abortions when, for other medical procedures,
they were only called for if the physician observed something abnormal in the tissue. [d.
at 2517. The requirement of a second physician at post-viability abortions was not tailored properly to state interests because more often than not there was no chance for the
fetus to be born alive. [d. at 2529-30. Blackmun also argued that the parental consent
requirement represented a blanket veto power and that the alternate judicial procedure
described was also contrary to a minor's privacy rights. [d. at 2531-32.
233. [d. at 2526-27.
234. 103 S. Ct. 2532 (1983).
235. [d. at 2540. VA. CODE §§ 18.2-73 (1950).
236. [d. at 2536-38 nn.5-6 and accompanying text. The Court explains the statutory
meaning of "hospital" as including outpatient surgical clinics.
237. [d. at 2539-40.
238. [d. at 2540.
239. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2504 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
240. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. at 2532 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting).
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she agreed with the result but dissented from the rationale. She based her decisions on an analysis entirely different
from the majority.

POUlOS,241

In all three opinions, O'Connor argued that the trimester
framework was unworkable. She suggested that the majority in
Akron demonstrated the trimester weaknesses by admitting that
the state has a compelling interest which attaches at approximately the commencement of the second trimester, while at the
same time the Court tinkered with the state's ability to protect
that interest where medicine had made certain advances. 242 The
result, O'Connor said, was to burden the state legislature with a
duty to conduct extensive research into the medical field to determine the latest advances whenever the state wanted to protect, through regulation, its legitimate interest in maternal
health or in the potentiality of human life. 243 What the Court
ought to have done, she asserted, was adopt an analysis which
utilized the "undue burden" test. 244 That test disregards the trimester framework altogether and defines the state's interest as
compelling throughout the entire pregnancy.2411 To suggest that
at the later stages of a woman's pregnancy, the state's interest is
compelling, while earlier it is not, was arbitrary. O'Connor insisted that the only consistent approach is to recognize that the
state's interest is compelling at conception. 246 The state should
be able to protect its interests, in both maternal health and the
potentiality of human life, without close scrutiny unless the regulation places an undue burden on the right to choose to have
an abortion.247 In other words, unless the state substantially prevents a woman from exercising her right,248 the state regulation
need only be rationally related to the interest it seeks to protect.24B According to O'Connor, none of the challenged regula241. Simopoulos, 103 S. Ct. at 2540 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
242. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2504-06.
243. [d. at 2506-07.
244. [d. at 2505.
245. [d.
246. [d. at 2509.
247. [d. at 2509-11. O'Connor argued that state restrictions which impose severe
criminal sanctions or an absolute spousal consent requirement would create an "undue
burden." [d. at n.8 (emphasis added; citations omitted) and 2509-11.
248. [d. at 2510-11.
249. Id.
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tions exerted an undue burden on a woman's access to an abortion. In all three cases, a woman was not substantially prevented
from obtaining an abortion and the regulations were reasonably
related to protecting the state's compelling interests. 2l1o Therefore, all the regulations should have been found constitutional.
The Akron majority pointed out that though O'Connor
would stop short of overruling Roe, her analysis "is wholly incompatible with the existence of the fundamental right recognized [therein]."2111 Indeed, O'Connor completely ignored Roe as
precedent by dismissing it as a decision unable to weather the
passage of time and, therefore, not capable of being binding. 2112
Her unfortunate response to the problems with the Court's analysis and its reliance on Roe in Akron and the other cases, was to
barely recognize the fundamental right to choose to have an
abortion.21i3 Further, by constructing a test which extends the
compelling interests of the state and lowers the threshold of relation which its regulations must reach, she would severely limit
whatever right she thinks may exist. By neither affording the
right much credence nor requiring much justification for the
state's regulations, O'Connor would effectively destroy the right
altogether. 2114
Justice O'Connor's failure to support this fundamental right
was a severe blow to feminists who had cautiously suggested
that, based on her strong adherence to a state's autonomy versus
federal intervention, and in view of her sensitivity to sexual ste250. In both Ashcroft and Simopoulos, O'Connor concurred in the judgments upholding the restrictions at issue but she dissented from any reliance on the trimester
framework. By her "undue burden" analysis, she found none of the regulations place
significant burdens on a woman's right to choose an abortion. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. at
2532; Simopoulos, 103 S. Ct. at 2540.
251. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2487-88 n.l.
252. [d. at 2508.
253. E.g., O'Connor said, "Even assuming that there is a fundamental right to terminate pregnancy .... " [d. (emphasis added). Such careful wording suggests she has
no confidence in the "right" or in the Roe decision which established it. In fact, she
escaped Roe as precedent by arguing that the trimester framework is constructed in such
a way as to create its own obsolescence. Medical advances over time are constantly
changing the meaning of the Roe framework; it cannot survive the passage of time as
good decisions ought. It should not, therefore, serve as a constraint on the Court through
stare decisis. Thus, O'Connor ignored Roe and proceeded to question the right it articulated. [d.
254. See supra notes 248, 252, and accompanying text. See also infra notes 258-63
and accompanying text.
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reotyping and discrimination, her philosophy could be reconciled
with the right of a woman to choose to have an abortion. 255 Had
O'Connor been willing to recognize a woman's reproductive autonomy as an "inner realm" or a personal sovereignty that ought
to be free from outside interference, her decision might have
been different.256 Obviously, O'Connor chose to defer to the legislature, especially since the right in question had been judicially
created without any express mandate from the Constitution.21i7
Where O'Connor failed to meet feminist expectations, the
Akron majority did little better. Although the Court did reaffirm
Roe and the existence of the fundamental right to choose to
have an abortion, it expanded the importance of the physician's
role. The unfortunate result of Akron is that it focused more on
a doctor's right to exercise his or her professional judgment than
on a woman's right to exercise a constitutionally protected
interest. 258
In addition, the Court based a significant portion of its rationale on advances in medicine. O'Connor pointed out a rather
intriguing problem which the majority has created for itself. By
emphasizing the key importance of medical advances in determining the nature and extent of permissible state regulations,
the majority analysis has put itself on a collision course with its
own reasoning. 259 While medical technology pushes forward the
time at which a safe abortion may be performed, it is at the
same time pushing back the point of viability of the fetus. With
the Court relying so heavily on the status of medical technology
in its rationale rather than on a woman's fundamental right, the
snake-eating-its-tail potential could become a reality. When the
collision occurs, and .certainly it will some day, the Court will
face a tremendous dilemma: how to reconcile the conflicting and
255. Kerr, supra note 4, at 71, 84.
256. [d. See also supra note 48 and accompanying test.
257. Supra note 193 and accompanying text.
258. Note, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Due Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 70, 78
(1983). The rationale of the Court in Akron depends more on preserving the discretion of
doctors than on the rights of women. This insulates the Court from some of the controversy surrounding the moral issues but it leaves the right to choose an abortion vulnerable to attacks on funding, or minors, etc. In addition, it virtually replaces the state's
restrictions with the doctor's control, leaving women still at the hands of another's discretion. [d. at 84-85. See Wildman, supra note 51, at 302-03 and accompanying text.
259. 103 S. Ct. at 2506. See Note, supra note 258; see also infra note 262.
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concurrent interests of a woman's right to choose an abortion
and the state's interest in the potentiality of human life. 260
Feminists reaped a hollow victory in the majority opinion in
Akron,261 and no victory whatsoever in Justice O'Connor's analysis. 262 Without any strong endorsement of this essential but vulnerable right, the survival of a woman's choice to have an abortion seems precarious.
III. CONCLUSION
Sandra Day O'Connor has excelled as a symbol of achievement and recognition for women. She has demonstrated skill,
professionalism, and dignity in a position which had been exclusively male for nearly 200 years. Presumably, she has opened the
door to this male sanctum so that women will be considered on
an equal basis with men for future appointments. 263 She symbolizes a milestone in women's history. However, for feminist expectations of a positive effect on women's rights, she has been
less than a success.
. Her record on gender discrimination in employment and education is comparatively strong. However, her treatment of the
abortion cases was abysmal. She failed to recognize that comprehensive reproductive autonomy is basic to women's struggle for
access to full and· equal participation in all aspects of society.
Without that fundamental understanding, Justice O'Connor has
fallen short of feminist expectations. Where feminists hoped
O'Connor's experiences as a woman in a modern society would
lead to some insight into the need for legal recognition of reproductive autonomy, she retreated to the familiar conservative
260. Note, supra note 258, at 86. The precarious victory in the majority opinion in
itself "erodes women's abortion rights even as it purports to affirm them." Id.
261. Id. See also Note, supra note 258, at 86.
262. Note, Constitutional Law-Right to Privacy-Municipal Roadblock to Abortion Denounced-City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 103 S.
Ct. 2481 (1983), 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 658 (1984). Even recognizing the problems with
the Roe framework, O'Connor's solution is "unsatisfactory" in its treatment of the right
to terminate pregnancy. Id. at 681.
263. Some feminists and Court observers suspect that O'Connor has merely established a woman's seat and the remainder of the Court will continue as male. See Slotnik,
Gender, Affirmative Action, and Recruitment to the Federal Bench, 14 GOLDEN GATE
U.L. REV. 519, 519 (1984). "O'Connor's appointment ... perhaps sets a precedent for a
"women's seat" on the Court analogous to the "seats" sometimes attributed to regional,
ethnic, religious and, more recently, racial interests." Id.
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doctrines of restraint and deference. Feminists had expected her
decision-making process to be affected not only by her conservative background and philosophy, but by her gender as well. They
wanted O'Connor to reconcile the tension between these two
themes and emerge with a feminist perspective broad enough to
encompass reproductive rights. Clearly this did not come to
pass.
Feminists are left with a symbolic achievement for women
but no positive, concrete gains in women's rights. Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor is then a token for feminists, "having semblance
of the real thing, but having no substance,"264 effecting no significant change in the Court's perception of gender discrimination.
Justice O'Connor is only a symbolic triumph; as a substantive
achievement for women, she has failed.
Margaret A. Miller*

264. WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2404
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